In the present document we share the preliminary results of a 4-month study about the TOR routing protocol from a statistical and combinatorial point of view. For the moment we only give the final data not the algorithms and technical/mathematical approaches (to be fair with conferences where we will present them first).
We have modeled exhaustively all possible routes while taking di fferent parameters into account with the data provided by the TOR foundation only. We have then confronted our theoretical model with the reality on the ground. To do this, we generated thousands of roads on the TOR network and compared the results obtained with those predicted by the theory. A last step of combinatorial analysis has enabled us to identify critical subsets of Onion routers (ORs). We have also managed to extract most of the relay bridges and give an initial list of nearly 2500 relays bridges.
Important notice: we do not claim to have broken TOR in any way. These results are just preliminary results data that will be presented in two parts, each in an international security event. Right after those events, this paper will be extended to provide most of technical details, algorithms, protocols we have set up and used. From those results anyone can figure out the interest, the impact and consequences of them.